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Pre-emptive interaction in language change and ontogeny:  
The case of [there is no NP] 
 
Abstract    
 
This study is centred on the pre-emptive dimension of interactional exchanges. Dialogues are not 
merely characterised by information transmission，they are also constantly informed by pre-emptive 
attempts to address potential reactions to what is being said. We argue that pre-emptive interaction 
intersects with intersubjectivity (i.a. Traugott 2003; Schwenter & Waltereit 2010; Tantucci 2017a, 
2020) and constitutes an important trigger of semantic-pragmatic reanalysis and constructional 
change. We provide a corpus-based study centred on the change of the [there is no NP] construction 
in Early Modern English dialogic interaction. During 16th century the chunk is originally used in 
assertions, yet it then progressively acquires a new function of pre-emptive refusal. Something similar 
is at stake throughout the child’s ontogeny. We provide corpus-based data from the CHILDES 
database of first language acquisition to show that children’s ability to use [there is no NP] to address 
potential reactions to what is being said occurs only after the fourth year of age, that is after the critical 
stage where a Theory of Mind (ToM) starts to become fully developed (i.a. Apperly 2010; Wellman 
2014). Pre-emptive interaction correlates diachronically and ontogentically with ToM and underpins 
a projected turn taking of a specific or generic interlocutor as a result of what is being currently said.           
 
1 Introduction  
 
This paper aims at establishing a new pragmatic and semantic category of pre-emptive interaction. 
Pre-emptive interaction intersects with intersubjectivity, as it marks the speaker’s attention to “[the 
addresse]’s image needs” (i.a.Traugott & Dasher 2002: 177; Traugott 2003; Schwenter & Waltereit 
2010; Tantucci 2017a, 2020; Tantucci & Wang 2018, 2020a, 2020b) and underpins overt attempts to 
tackle how an interlocutor is expected to react as a result of an on-going speech event. Pre-emptive 
interaction occurs as a linguistically overt strategy to address a projected turn taking of a specific or 
generic interlocutor as a result of what is being currently said. 
 We ground our discussion in enactment cognition (cf. Engel et al. 2013), and we suggest that 
human ability to pre-emptively address an interlocutor’s potential reaction to what is being said is a 
form of prediction error minimisation (cf. Friston 2010; Friston et al. 2012; Clark 2013). We propose 
that similar to the way we constantly rely on senso-motorial ability to predict possible problems 
arising from physical actions, we also monitor and predict possible issues that might arise through 
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dialogues and conversations. In this sense, pre-emptive interaction constitutes an important human 
ability to predict and foresee the interlocutor’s reaction to what we are currently saying. We argue 
that semantic and pragmatics shifts from ongoing to pre-emptive interaction are important triggers of 
intersubjectification. We substantiate this claim by providing a case-study about the constructional 
change of [there is no NP], shifting from an original existential meaning and assertive illocutionary 
force (i.a Kissine 2013; Tantucci 2016a) towards a new intersubjectified usage. This new reanalysis 
leads to new pre-emptive refusal usages, whereby the speaker/writer rejects what the interlocutor or 
a generic social persona may potentially say about a current utterance. The new illocutionary force 
of the construct significantly intersects with new formal features such as presence of a complementing 
clause, discourse-new status of the NP and the generic reference to the ‘locus of existence’ of the NP. 
In the final part of the paper, we look at ontogenetic data from the CHILDES database, and verify 
whether similar pre-emptive polysemies of [there is no NP] arise before or after the 4th year of age 
of the child, viz. what is considered to be the critical period in which a Theory of Mind mechanism 
starts to fully develop ontogenetically (cf. Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007; Kovacs et 
al. 2010; Tantucci 2020).  
 This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an introductory discussion about 
enacted theory in cognitive psychology. A special focus is placed on the notion of prediction-error-
minimisation (PEM) in connection with a conceptualiser’s epistemic reasoning. Section 3 tackles 
PEM in connection with intersubjectivity in cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. We argue that a 
fundamental element of intersubjectified constructions is the one of pre-emptively addressing how 
the speaker presumes the hearer may react as a result of his/her on-going speech. Section 4 is centred 
on the [there is no NP] construction and provides a corpus-based study of the constructional change 
of the chunk in the Corpus of English Dialogues (CED). From a multiple correspondence analysis 
(i.a. Nenadic and Greenacre 2007), a mixed effects logistic regression of pragmatic and grammatical 
change of the chunk, will emerge that [there is no NP] started to acquire a new pre-emptive refusal 
usage out of an original assertive one throughout the 17th and the 18th century. Section 5 is finally 
focused on the spontaneous employment of [there is no NP] in first language acquisition. A large-
scale corpus-based analysis from the CHILDES shows that pre-emptive refusal usages of [there is no 
NP] are acquired and mastered significantly later than assertive usages of the same construct. In 
particular, the child shows capacity to spontaneously master the construction only after the 4th year 
of age, viz. when a theory of mind ability tends to be extensively developed.                  
 
2 Prediction-error-minimisation in interaction 
 
 3 
Over the last two decades a new“ pragmatic turn” has emerged in cognitive science. This novel 
paradigm has been progressively drifting away from the traditional representation-centred model 
(Schilbach et al. 2013) of cognitive processes and started tackling cognition as being inherently 
“enactive”, that is as subserving action and sensorimotor skills (Varela et al. 1992; Clark 1998; Noe 
2004; Engel et al. 2014). From this angle, neural activity patterns are studied with respect to their 
functional role in action generation. Cognitive states are then addressed as foregrounding and 
prescribing possible actions rather than statically representing states of the outside world.  
 The intentional and goal-oriented dimension of enacted cognition is relevant for research in 
cognitive linguistics and pragmatics, as skills of sensory motor contingencies allow conceptualisers 
to develop higher cognitive abilities and social interaction (Di Paolo & De Jaeger 2012). In fact, 
learning and mastery of action-effect contingencies are at play through interaction between the subject 
and his/her surroundings. As enacted cognition inherently hinges on the process of reaching and 
maintaining an expected state, action and interaction both occur as a result of predicting how being 
in a desired condition would change the received sensory input (Hommel 2013). This clearly 
underpins the necessity to anticipate possible actions and linguistic acts from others and thus to enable 
effective coupling of agents in social contexts. This pre-emptive dimension of enacted interaction is 
based on perceptual and active inference geared to prediction-error-minimisation (PEM) (Friston 
2010; Friston et al. 2012; Clark 2013). Subjective goals are pursued through sensory-motor skills and 
problematisation of contingent obstacles and possible errors that may occur through actions and 
interactions. An example of this is when one conceptualiser actively explores a pipe in his/her hand 
by turning it around and looking at it from different angles, then increasing the confidence that s/he 
is looking at a pipe and not merely at an image of a pipe (Hohwy 2016) or another object that simply 
resembles a pipe. From an interactional perspective, prediction-error-minimisation combines with 
Clark’s (1996) idea of joint projects and event-reaction pairs, whereby an interlocutor’s instigating 
event (generally at the illocutionary level) is inherently expected to lead to an addressee’s reaction 
(Clark 1996: 194). When interactional mismatches arise between instigating event and ‘expected 
reaction’, interlocutors encounter what Clark defines as ‘joint project problems’, which may lead to 
various forms of communication breakdown, hinging on (im-)politeness, face-threats or 
misunderstanding.  
 Most crucially, interlocutors often pre-emptively make attempts to tackle potential joint 
project problems, and try to pre-emptively minimise ‘errors’ that may arise through interaction. This 
is connected with the mechanism of vigilance (i.a. Sperber et al. 2010; Reboul 2017; Mercier & 
Sperber 2017; Mercier 2020) suggesting that evolution of human reasoning has happened in a context 
in which social and interactional pressures were of fundamental importance, in particular involving 
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the need to win an argument and, at the same time, to carefully evaluate others arguments and 
objections. The anticipatory dimension of pre-emptive interaction is thus a crucial mechanism 
allowing speakers to monitor and foresee co-actional and interactional issues that may arise as a result 
of their turn takings. In this study, we argue that prediction-error-minimisation (PEM) overtly comes 
into play in language, as a pragmatic attempt to pre-emptively addresses forthcoming turn-takings 
that are likely to occur in conversation. Consider the following example of a so-called joint project 
as “a joint action projected by one of his participants and taken out by the others” (Clarks 1996: 191): 
 
(1) Arthur: U:h what modern poets have you been reading. 
 Beth:  Well, I’m. I like Robert Greaves very much. 
(Clark 1996: 191) 
 
The joint project above begins with Arthur projecting a joint task for Beth and himself to carry out. 
She is expected to tell him what modern poets she has been reading. It continues with Beth agreeing 
to the project as she answers Arthur’s question. Even more importantly, what is of interest here is the 
fact that Beth not only replies to Arthur’s question at the propositional level, but additionally 
addresses what she thinks is likely to be a further turn-taking on Arthur’s behalf, namely do you like 
them? / Which ones you like? Pragmatically, Beth infers the way the conversation is likely to continue 
and pre-emptively engages with a foreseeable topic.  
 
3 Intersubjectivity and pre-emptive interaction  
 
Pre-emptive interaction often intersects with intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity in the literature is 
addressed from a number of different perspectives, e.g. as a grounding mechanism hinging on 
spatial/epistemic perspective-taking (i.a. Langacker 1991; Verhagen 2005; Dancygier & Sweetser 
2012), as a shared dimension underpinning evidential reasoning as opposed to subjective opinions 
(i.a. Nuyts 2001, 2012; Tantucci 2013, 2016b), or as function to establish joint attention among 
interlocutors (e.g. Diessel 2006; Breban 2010; Ghesquière et al. 2012). Intersubjectivity has been 
treated and re-interpreted in a multitude of different ways (i.a. Langacker 1991; Nuyts 2001, 2012; 
Traugott 2003; Guesquière and Van de Velde 2011, Tantucci 2020). Spatial deictics have been 
discussed as markers of joint attention and intersubjectivity (Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991; Diessel 
2006; Breban 2010; Guesquière et al. 2012). Demonstratives and determining elements like such and 
zulk have been similarly considered intersubjective, as they serve to create a ‘joint focus of attention
(Diessel 2006: 465) by which the speaker negotiates discourse referent tracking for the hearer 
(Guesquière 2009; Guesquière and Van de Velde 2011).  
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 A rather different approach to the notion of intersubjectivity is discussed by Traugott (cf. 
2003, 2012). In her diachronic model of intersubjectification, speakers markedly code attention to the 
social self of the hearer (e.g. Traugott & Dasher 2002). She observes that less-intersubjective (e.g. 
literal) constructions show a clear tendency to progressively develop new polysemies with novel 
intersubjectified functions. For instance, pragmatic marking (PM) of adverbials such as actually or in 
fact are intersubjective as they function to hedge or mitigate what has been said and acknowledge the 
addressee’s actual or possible objections.  
 Verhagen (2005, 2007) also developed an influential account of intersubjectivity, that is 
centred on cognitive coordination between speaker and hearer. In his view, intersubjective 
constructions foreground the hearer as active interpreter and conceptualiser of utterances of the 
speaker. He remarks that the hearers reaction to what is said are often part of the semantics of 
intersubjectified expressions. A case in point are connectives such as but or moreover, which are often 
used to accommodate the addressee/reader’s projected expectations through an interaction.  
 There is also a well-known epistemic strand in the literature about intersubjectivity. Nuyts 
(2001a, 2001b, 2012) argues that intersubjective constructions hinge on modal meanings “presented 
as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) 
including the hearer” (Nuyts 2012: 58) as for constructions such as it is likely, unfortunately and so 
on. In a similar manner, Tantucci (2013, 2017a, 2017b, 2020) distinguishes meanings that are 
specifically centred on the hearer’s potential reactions to what is said, from meanings that include a 
specific or generic social persona, who is assumed as the social bearer of the utterance. 
Intersubjectivity is also an important topic in interactional linguistics. In this case, it is often brought 
to the fore as ‘shared understanding (Linell & Lindstrom 2016) which is realised in the form of turn-
takings of repair, reaction or expansion to achieve a socially shared cognition (Schlegoff 1991, 1992). 
Equally influential are qualitative discussions about the intersection of counterfactual reasoning and 
intersubjectivity as in the case of Mental Space Grammars (i.a. Dancygier & Sweetser 2012).  
 In this paper we take the stance that intersubjectively marked expressions are inherently 
geared towards projected reactions of an interlocutor to a current utterance. Our argument is that 
prediction-error-minimisation (PEM) is a crucial element of intersubjectively marked interaction. 
Strategies hinging on (im-)politeness and meta-discursive functions such as turn-giving, agreement-
seeking or elicitation of response (Traugott 2012: 10) are all cases in point whereby an interlocutor 
foresees and pre-emptively tackles possible issues arising from an ongoing exchange. Sentence-
peripheral usages of constructions such as clearly, actually, believe it or not, no doubt and so on, all 
encode speaker’s attitude towards the addressee, rather than directly modifying the verb (Traugott & 
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Dasher 2002; Tantucci 2017a). An instance of this can be the imperative construction Look! when it 
is used as an attention-giving device (e.g. Romero Trillo 1997; De Clerk 2006: 168):  
  
 (2) Look!  
 
 (3)  Look Dani. You don't know what you're speaking about.  
BNC / KB1 / 5112  
(Van Olmen 2010: 228; Tantucci 2020)  
 
In (3), look is redundant at the propositional level. However, it expresses the intention to overtly 
account for the potentially negative impact of the utterance towards addressee’s ‘positive face (cf. 
Brown & Levinson 1987). It is reasonable to expect a child younger than 4 being able to utter the 
former expression (2), viz. in the form of a directive. On the other hand, it is not farfetched to suggest 
that the latter usage in (3) will be‘ cognitively mastered at a comparatively later stage of ontogenetic 
development. In fact, with the overt employment of Look as pragmatic marker (PM) in (3), the speaker 
predicts that the addressee/reader may somehow react negatively to his/her utterance and tries to 
minimise potential joint project problems that may arise from the current utterance. In this sense, 
intersubjective forms often occur as PEM operators and are overtly codified as a ‘surplus of meaning’ 
over mere propositional or co-actional meaning (Tantucci 2020). 
 From a usage-based perspective, intersubjectivity can be operationally identified as surplus 
of meaning that interlocutors codify in addition to ego-centric goals and intentions that could be 
expressed merely in the form of a co-action (Tantucci in press). The surplus-approach (cf. Tantucci, 
Culpeper & Di Cristofaro 2018) is centred on the premise that new intersubjectifed polysemies of a 
construction arise and become conventional as a response to interactional needs. Speakers re-cycle 
an existing form to express a new meaning centred on the addressee (or a third party) and thus improve 
the chances to achieve some sort of perlocutionary effects. This may unveil a gradient continuum 
from ego-centric co-actional engagement to more complex awareness of social cognition. The latter 
is reflected by the progressive ability of the child to spontaneously employ increasingly 
intersubjectified polysemies or functions of the same construct (cf. Tantucci 2020). In some cases, 
the intersubjective ‘surplus’ of peripheral PMs may be characterised by a ‘division of labour’ between 
right and left periphery. Downing (2001) observes that left peripheral employment of surely in 
evaluations intersects with seeking agreement or corroboration: 
 
 (4) Surely he must be worried? 
 (Downing 2001:268)  
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The clause-peripheral employment of surely acts as an overt ‘surplus’ of meaning pre-emptively 
codifying the speaker/writer’s awareness of addressee/reader’s potential reactions to his/her 
evaluation. In fact, when surely is used as a PM, it should not be logically compatible with rhetorical 
interrogative speech acts geared towards agreement seeking. Even in this case, we argue that this is 
due to the pre-emptive dimension of the intersubjective function of surely, through which the 
speaker/writer overtly foresees and engages with his/her interlocutor’s agreement with what is said.  
 The pre-emptive dimension is similarly present in [and don’t you VP] imperatives. This is a 
chunked construction, whereby the connective and does not express some kind of logic coordination 
among two sentences, but is rather used to introduce a directive speech act of ‘pre-emptive 
prohibition’. In fact, with this construction the speaker is not referring back to some discourse-given 
topic that was introduced previously. Rather, s/he pro-actively hypothesises a possible reaction of the 
speaker as a result of what is being currently said and pre-emptively prohibits him/her to perform it. 
Consider examples (5-6) from the spoken section of the BNC: 
 
(5) I’m not putting it on you anyway mostly it’s c— mainly fucking Catherine, I’m beginning to  
 s— not like her any more the way she’s going <pause> and don’t you dare mention a word  
 of this that I’m saying to you. 
BNC / KP4 / 2098 
 
(6) You never found that music, we’ve got a lovely song <pause> out of Willy Wonka. And  
 don’t you laugh! 
BNC / KD8 / 2900 
 
Examples (5) and (6) are both demographically sampled. In the first case, the speaker (Cassie) informs 
her interlocutor (Bonnie) that she does not trust a common friend (Catherine) anymore. During her 
own turn taking, Cassie makes use of the [and don’t you VP] construction to pre-emptively forbid her 
to let Catherine know about what is she currently saying. The [and don’t you VP] is uttered by Cassie 
to pre-emptively address the way she imagines or foresees Bonnie may react as a result of what she 
is currently saying. Something similar is at stake in (6), whereby the speaker (Martine) foresees that 
her interlocutor (Marielle) may burst out laughing as a result of her utterance. She similarly employs 
the [and don’t you VP] construction to pre-emptively admonish her not to do so. In both cases, the 
speaker opts for a marked surplus of meaning that would not be necessary in a simple imperative 
construction [don’t VP]. The latter, in fact, simply expresses an order, yet it is not marked as a 
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construction that is inherently geared towards the anticipation of what the speaker expects the hearer 
might do as a result of his/her turn taking.   
 
4 There existentials and the [there is no NP] construction 
 
In this section we introduce the so-called there existential construction [there is NP] and then 
specifically discuss pre-emptive usages of its negative form [there is no NP].  
 There is extensive literature on there existentials in English (i.a. Jenkins 1975; Lakoff 1987; 
Abbott 1993; Biber et al. 1999; Huddleston & Pullum 2002). Most accounts deal with the semantics 
of definiteness and specificity, particularly in connection with the declarative form of the construction 
(i.a. Prince 1981, 1992; Clark & Marshall 1981; Abbot 1997). The bulk of the literature centred on 
existential constructions has touched upon the common feature of “attributing a location'' to the 
central entities (e.g., Kahn 1966; Anderson 1971; Fillmore 1968; Lyons 1975; Bolinger 1977; Fawcett 
1987). Existential there is therefore often claimed to designate the abstract location of some central 
entity, which may be further specified by the locative phrase found in many existential clauses. 
Enumerative vs cardinal distinctions are also discussed in relation to there existentials (cf. Milsark 
1977; Davidse 1999). These challenge the locative interpretation of English canonical existentials – 
according to which the existential there is analysed as an adverb designating an abstract location, as 
in Lyons (1975) – in favour of a quantified instantiation of the relevant type specifications conveyed 
by the existent NP.  
 However, our enquiry is based on the negative form of there existentials. In this case, the  
definiteness status of the NP is not a central issue in our discussion, which in negatives is by default 
generic. The present account is rather centred on the pre-emptive usages of the chunk such as the one 
in (7): 
 
(7) The honourable member for Perry Barn I've again referred to what, part of what he said er 
 but Gibraltar I have considerable amount of of sympathy with the remarks that he made. I’m  
 afraid that er there was a decision within the community which was then er made part of the  
 nineteen seventy six E C direct elections act. There is no way that we can change those  
 without the agreement of all other members community er but I know that it’s something  
 that er my colleagues at the foreign office are extremely concerned with. 
BNC / JSH / 399 
 
In the House of Commons’ debate reported above, the MP is referring back to a decision that has 
been made about the ‘Gibraltar case’. Throughout his monologue, he foresees possible objections to 
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this act and even potential attempts to subvert it in Parliament. The inferred turn that other MPs may 
take at the end of his speech is pre-emptively tackled by the same speaker with the negative existential 
[there is no way that VP]. From an enactive perspective, the MP is here trying to minimise a possible 
‘error’ (which interactionally can be intended as a form of conflict, misunderstanding or face threat) 
that he predicts might arise as a result of his ongoing speech. At the same time, the illocutionary force 
of p is the one of refusal in that s/he markedly signals that s/he is not willing to address that issue 
further than what the real addressee or a generic third party in society may be expected to do (cf. 
Tantucci 2013, 2020 on extended intersubjectivity; see also Roberts 2012 on coercion in information 
structure). Simply put, the speaker pre-emptively forces the resolution (cf. Stommel 2011: 78; 
Lohnstein 2016 on so-called verum focus) of a fictive polar question (cf. Pasqual on fictive 
interaction, but see also the notion of QUD, e.g. Roberts 2012) that a generic social interlocutor may 
be expected to ask under the same preparatory conditions: Can we change those without the 
agreement of all other members community? (cf. Searle 1976 on preparatory conditions of speech 
acts).  
 Something similar is at stake in (8) below: 
 
(8) A: Just briefly how do you encourage more women into the Labour party, very briefly, when 
  
 they constitute fifty two percent of the population? 
 B: But they're not fifty two percent of the candidates. 
 B: And what we've got in standing for a general election is about two and a half thousand men 
  and about five hundred women. There is no way you're gonna get equality, with that  
  volume.  
BNC / KGL / 141 
 
The politician B in (8) is being interviewed about gender equality in Parliament. While he makes his 
point against a numerically equal partition of seats, he predicts how his interlocutor – or a generic 
social persona – may refer to the idea of reaching gender equality and pre-emptively rejects it by 
resorting to the [there is no NP] construction. This strategy again, is interactionally triggered by the 
enactive awareness of what is likely to be the next turn taken by A. This is also exemplified in (9) 
below, where the speaker pre-emptively engages with what his/her interlocutor might suppose as a 
result of what s/he is currently saying.   
 
(9) it seems to me that vacant Normal vacancies as Mr […] has described them, are a function  
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 of people moving from one house to another. And it seems to me there is no reason to  
  
 suppose that because there are more houses, the propensity to move from one house to   
 another declines. 
BNC / HVF / 336 
 
An important diagnostic to disentangle existential and pre-emptive refusal usages of [there is no NP], 
is that only the latter are compatible with subsequent reinforcement of what has just been said by the 
speaker/writer in the form of this (indeed) cannot be done or this is not possible/true in case of stative 
predicates. Conversely, mere existential usages of the chunk cannot be referred back in the same way. 
Crucially, in the spoken section of the BNC nominal collocates in the NP slot of the constructions 
displaying the highest log-likelihood value are doubt (236.3), reason (221.9), way (214.3), need 
(172.6), evidence (83.9), guarantee (59.6), point (54.7), difference (35.6) and problem (33.8). None 
of those refer to concrete objects of entities that construe a prototypical existential meaning. Rather, 
they all tend to be geared towards the pre-emptive rejection of what a specific or generic interlocutor 
may wonder (there is no doubt that p, there is no reason that p), plan (there is no way that p) consider 
to be necessary (there is no need that p) and so on. In this sense, the working definition of rejection 
is not necessarily of a coercive kind, but rather underpins the speaker’s procedural dismissal of some 
real or epistemic project that s/he imagines a specific or generic interlocutor may propose under the 
same preparatory conditions. This interactional strategy is grounded in collective intentionality (cf. 
Tomasello 2019) and extended intersubjectivity (Tantucci 2017, 2020; Guardamagna 2017; Williams 
2018), as it is based on the understanding of the conventional behaviour and foreseeable reactions of 
the generic social persona of a socio-cultural community of practise. This is reflected linguistically 
by the reanalysis of constructions from a literal meaning to pre-emptive usages aimed at fictively 
capturing what the speaker expects the addressee – as well as anyone else in his/her socio-cultural 
community of practise – may have to say about his/her ongoing interaction, of which [don’t you VP] 
and [there is no NP] are cases in point.       
 In the following section, we provide a corpus-based account of the diachronic formation of 
pre-emptive polysemies of the negative existential [there is no NP] in British English dialogues and 
we shed light on the contextual, pragmatic and formal variables that significantly intersect with its 
development. An important fact that will emerge from this survey is the intersection between new 
intersubjectified polysemies and their characteristic of being pre-emptively geared towards the 
interlocutor’s potential reactions to the speaker’s current utterance.     
 
4.2 The semasiological change of [there is no NP] 
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An important element of enacted interaction is the speaker's on-going monitoring of the hearer’s 
potential reactions to the utterance and his/her attempt to tackle them pre-emptively. In this respect, 
we designed a corpus-survey centred on the semasiological change of [there is no NP] in the the 
Corpus of English Dialogues (CED). 
 The constructional change of [there is no NP] primarily underpins alteration of 
compositionality and procedurality. Compositionality decreases when the meaning of a construction 
becomes progressively less derivable from the meaning of its parts, e.g. the construction [believe it 
or not] shifting from being an imperative construct (Believe it or not, as you please, I am decided - 
COHA Frou Frou, 1879) to a new intersubjectified parenthetical function (Then I called back Mrs. 
Frankenthal and, believe it or not, she was free - COHA Chairman of the Bored, 1961) (cf. Tantucci 
2017a: 113-114). Such reanalysis entails that the imperative mood of the verb believe is then less 
analysable (e.g. it cannot occur in isolation as prototypical imperatives do), together with the meaning 
of the chunk being comparatively less compositional, no more expressing a transparent command. In 
the case of the [there is no NP] construction, decrease of compositionality is at stake when the 
predicate there is no no more expresses physical or abstract presence of a thing in some place or 
situation, but rather contributes to a less literal function of the whole chunk as a new pair of form and 
meaning, now primarily expressing the speaker/writer’s (un)willingness to engage in some 
future/hypothetical project. This shift is directly connected with the notion of procedurality, as the 
decrease of compositional and semantic transparency of the inner constituents of a construct may lead 
to a new semantic-pragmatic analysis of the chunk as a whole1. In the case of [there is no NP] we 
argue that a new procedural function emerges as the chunk starts to be employed as a pre-emptive 
refusal, in the place of its original assertive usage, originally merely stating the existence of 
something. 
 
4.3 Data retrieval 
 
For the retrieval of the [there is no NP] construction we had to account for the different spelling that 
there used to have at different stages of change through Early Modern English. Namely, from Early 
Modern English there, ther, thare, thar, thore, with alternative pronunciation spellings from Old 
English such as dar, der, dere and dey. We therefore extracted all the occurrences of the pattern there 
is no followed by a noun. As the number of occurrences of the construction varies from one corpus 
to the other, we adopted two different strategies. We manually annotated all the occurrences of [there 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that reduction of compositionality and increased procedurally can also be creatively inhibited 
throughout a process of constructional change (cf. Tantucci & Di Cristofaro 2019 on entrenchment inhibition).    
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is no NP] in the CED, as the total number (n = 161) allows for a manual annotation; the results were 
later normalised to Per Million Words (pmw) based on the diachronic subcorpora composing the 
CED. 
 
Period Tokens Occ. [there is no NP] Occ. [ther is no NP] 
1500_1599  243522 24 5 
1600_1699 924765 25 0 
1700_1799 272986 32 1 
Total: 1441273 164 7 
 
Table 1. 
CED sub-corpora size and spelling variations of [there is no NP]  
 
 
As shown in table 1, the CED contains very few occurrences of alternative spellings, e.g. [ther is no 
NP]. The CED contains details regarding the genre/type of the texts, which have been included in our 
analysis. These correspond to a specific set of labels such as Comedy, Fiction, Handbook, 
Miscellaneous, Trial, Witness Deposition included in the ‘Text type metadata field.  
 
4.4 Data annotation 
 
For each occurrence, our annotation was aimed at capturing new constructional changes of [there is 
no NP]. We took into account the following formal, semantic and pragmatic variables: 
 
- lexeme: the lexeme that appears in the noun slot. 
- century: the century in which the text was published.  
- illocutionary force: the type of illocutionary force present in the occurrence. This can be 
assertive, pre-emptive refusal, embedded (e.g. when [there is no NP] is part of a temporal 
clause, in which case no independent illocutionary force is associated with the 
construction). 
- complementing clause: whether the sentence has a complementing clause. 
- speaking subject: whether the speaking subject is present in the complementing clause. 
- discourse-givenness: whether the propositional content of the subordinate in [there is no 
NP] is discourse-given (or inferable) or not discourse-new. Discourse-given usages tend 
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to be existential in that p needs a ‘link or an ‘anchor to some other relevant proposition 
in the context. 
- reference: whether [there is no NP] refers to a specific place/space/situation (specific) or 
if merely expresses an existential meaning (generic). 
 
The annotation criteria are exemplified with the occurrences below: 
 
(9) You say that in loue2 there is no reason, and therefore there can be no likelyhood.  
 CED / D1CLYLY / 1660-1699 
(10) A: Goe and warme it in the Kitchene.  
  B: Sir, there is no fire there.  
COAED / D2HFWODR / 1600-1639 
 
Examples (9-10) are both cases where [there is no NP] is used as an assertive speech act. No pre-
emptive polysemies are conveyed by neither of the two usages. Neither of (9-10) includes a 
complementing clause attached to the NP and thus no speaking subject occurring in the rest of the 
utterance. The ‘locus of existence is specific (in loue; there) while the reference of the NPs reason 
and fire are discourse-given.  
 
(11)  Dame quoth hee I thanke you, but there is no reason I should sit on a cushion till I haue  
 deserued it. 
CED / D2FDELON / 1600-1639 
 
Things are different in (11). Here the NP is introduced for the first time in the discourse and the 
construct now includes a complementing clause [there is no NP COMP-C] where the speaking subject 
I is also present. The reference to the locus of existence is now generic as there is no place/situation 
that ‘contains the NP reason. Finally, the illocutionary force here has now shifted to the one of a pre-
emptive refusal. This can be tested as, different from (9-10), (11) can be subsequently referred to with 
the expression this cannot be done. From a constructional point of view, the chunk is less 
compositional, as there is no expression of physical/abstract existence of a thing in some 
place/situation. It is also more schematic as the NP slot can be now occupied by any noun, whilst 
earlier merely existential forms were limited to nouns that could be ‘present in some physical or 
abstract locus of existence. In fact, a mere assertive usage of there is no reason without a 
                                                 
2 Love. 
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complementing clause is not idiomatic at this point in time and absent from the CED. The chunk is 
also more procedural – as opposed to contentful – due to the fact that the construct headed by there 
is is employed to achieve the perlocutionary effects of pre-emptively refusing to perform an action, 
rather than primarily expressing the presence of something somewhere.                 
 In (12) below is given a similar example of pre-emptive refusal with absence of the speaking 
subject in the complementing clause:  
 
(12) But in this we have been so formal in the Distribution, that I do not think it necessary. and  
 therefore now there is no more to be done. 
CED / D2TCARR / 1616-1730 
 
Even in this case, the NP more to be done is not referred to as something that exists as such, but rather 
as a possible concern that the addressee or a generic third party might have as a result of the ongoing 
utterance.   
 
4.5 A constructional analysis of [there is no NP] in the CED 
 
This section is centred on the constructional change (cf. Traugott & Trousdale 2013) of [there is no 
NP] from the 16th up to the 18th century in the CED corpus. The main focus of the present analysis 
lies on the assumption that pre-emptive interaction is a process that is most prominently activated in 
dialogic interaction, whereby the interlocutor explores his/her own turn taking in order to engage with 
what they expect the addressee’s turn may be like. We plotted a multiple correspondence analysis 
(i.a. Nenadic and Greenacre 2007) looking at the holistic interaction of time in the CED with the 
significant co-variants among the ones we described in section 4.4 on a two-dimensional plane. In 
multiple correspondence analysis modelling (MCA), associations among variables are shown by 
calculating the chi-square distance between different categories of the variables and between 
observations. These associations are thus represented graphically in the form of a map, which eases 
the interpretation of the structures in the data, e.g. the closer the distance between variables, the 
stronger the statistical correspondence. More specifically, we looked at the interaction between 
illocutionary force and reference with time in the CED as illustrated in Figure 1 (R package: 
FactoMineR, Lê & Husson 2008). We fitted this model to specifically visualise the relationship 
between the semasiological shift from assertions to pre-emptive refusals and reference. This allows 
to capture the diachronic shift of the [there is no NP] in the direction to generic expressions and 




Multiple correspondence analysis of illocutionary force and reference of [there is no NP] in the 
CED 
 
The two dimensions on the x and the y axis in Figure 1 above do not refer to a specific variable. They 
exclusively bear statistical significance, viz. they determine spatially the attraction versus repulsion 
of between the three variables of this model, i.e. the century in which [there is no NP] occurred, the 
reference type (specific vs generic) and the illocutionary force (that is whether the construction was 
used as a bare assertion, or whether it involved a pre-emtpive refusal). From the plot, it is possible to 
note that in the CED there is a strong correspondence of a pre-emptive refusal force with 1700, in 
combination with generic reference. In fact, they appear quite close to one another, at the right hand-
side of the map (cf. Tantucci & Wang 2018, 2020a, 2020b for specific applications of MCA in cross-
cultural, diachronic and developmental pragmatics). As we argued in section 3.1, generic reference 
intersects with intersubjectivity, as the speaker is not propositionally referring to an object being 
present in some physical or abstract space, but rather metalinguistically referring to a forthcoming 
turn taking on the addressee’s behalf. On the left-hand side of the plot, original assertive usages 
(labeled as asser) of [there is no NP] are closely associated with specific reference (labeled as spec) 
usage during the 1600. The above model is based on two dimensions, which in some cases may not 
be enough to capture the overall variation among the variables considered. A general rule of thumb 
to assess the degree of accuracy of MCA plotting is to calculate the percentage of variation that is 
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captured on a two-dimensional plain and to see whether it is superior to at least 70% (cf. Levshina 
2015: 382). This can be verified with the mjca() function in the R ca package (cf. Greenacre et al. 
2016). The two dimensions above can capture more than 82% of the overall variation among century, 
illocutionary force and reference, which makes the plot in figure 2 a reliable visualisation of the 
correspondence among the three variables. Some examples from the present dataset ae given below:  
 
(13) It is more pitie that there is no more disciplin among men. 
(13) *a. This cannot be done. 
CED / D2HOCHUR / 1600-1639 
(14) In an indictment of Rape, there is no time of prosecution necessary, for nullum tempus  
 occurrit regi. 
(14) a. This cannot be done. 
CED / D2WMERVI / 1601 
(15) the King is concerned for His life: you are to speak the truth and the whole truth; for there is  
 no reason in the world that you should adde any one thing that is false.  
(15) a. This cannot be done. 
CED / D3TCOLEM / 1678 
 
The illocutionary force of (13) is assertive, as what is stated is essentially an existential meaning, e.g. 
the mere absence of something real or abstract with reference to some state of affairs. The locus of 
existence in (13) is specific, namely among men and the proposition cannot be referred to with this is 
not to be (cannot) done (*13a). From our data, assertive employment of [there is no NP] shows a 
tendency to intersect with absence of a complementing clause, while the opposite is true for pre-
emptive refusals. Both (13-14) above are cases of pre-emptive refusal, as in both cases the 
speaker/writer could anaphorically reinforce his/her statement with this is not to (cannot) be done 
(14a-15a). Both (14-15) are also inherently discourse-new, as the speaker/writer negatively foresees 
an addressee or a generic third party’s stance associated with some future or hypothetical state of 
affairs. 
 At this point, it was important to shed light on the variables that are significantly at play in 
the reanalysis form assertive to pre-emptive refusal usages of [there is no NP]. To do so, we modelled 
a mixed effects logistic regression (cf. Baayen et al. 2008). The latter can help to assess whether 
refusal usages of [there is no NP] would indeed be favoured at comparatively later time-spans of the 
CED. Mixed effects logistic regression helps to model binary outcome variables (Baayen 2008; Jäger 
2008) with two types of factors that are mixed in this kind of analysis: fixed factors and random 
factors. Random factors are used to systematically exclude variation that can be deemed as ‘random
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or unpredictable, and thus only indirectly affecting the response variable. For instance, factors that 
could arguably be considered to be random are the number of speakers in a given corpus or the number 
of verbs that are found in a given construction. The separation of the effects of random factors allows 
the analyst to assess more reliably the effects of the remaining fixed factors, and the findings can be 
generalised beyond the current data set with greater confidence (cf. Hilpert 2013: 52-53) 
 Our model thus included Illocutionary force as a binomial response variable (i.e. Assertive vs 
Refusal), Century as independent variable, and Genre as a random effect, other fixed effects were 
discarded due to multicollinearity. The results of this analysis are reported below (cf. Baayen et al. 
2008; Hilpert 2013 for mixed effect models with diachronic linguistic data): 
 
Random Effects     
Groups Name  Variance Std. Dev.  
Genre (Intercept)  0.628  0.792  
Fixed Effects     
 Estimate Std.Error Z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept)  -2.341  0.522  -4.487 7.23e-06 *** 
Century 1600  1.334  0.394 3.387 0.000708 *** 




Mixed effects logistic regression of the illocutionary force of [there is no NP] in the CED 
 
 
In the random effects section, the column at the right hand-side of the table is called Std. Dev.  
(Standard Deviation) and indicates the variability from the predicted values due to the random effects 
added to the model (viz. the textual Genre in which the construction occurs). It thus reflects the fact 
that every utterance has some unexpected factors that affect usage in addition to the fixed effects. In 
the fixed effects section, under the Estimate column, the coefficients Intercept, Century 1600 (1.33) 
and Century 1700 (.97) indicate the slope of the categorical effects of polysemic usages of [there is 
no NP]. These are the dimensions are assumed to correlate with a prevalence of pre-emptive refusals 
vs assertive usages of [there is no NP]. From the Estimate column we can see that refusal usages have 
positive values both for 1600 and 1700. What this means is that in the comparison between 1500 and 
1600, there is a significantly positive value (Z = 3.39, p < .0005) indicating that the latter shows an 
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increase of pre-emptive refusal usages at the expenses of assertive ones. The same comparison also 
leads to significant results in relation to 1700 (Z = 2.6, p < .05). 
 Put simply, the model indicates that [there is no NP] across 1500 and 1600 underwent a process 
of intersubjectification. A literal meaning of expressing that some object was located in some space 
shifted towards a new function of pre-emptive refusal, literally expressing I am pre-emptively 
declaring that p cannot be done. With the latter, the speaker would go beyond mere co-actional 
interaction and encode a surplus of meaning aimed at responding to projected turn-taking of a specific 
or generic addressee.  
 
5 Pre-emptive polysemies of [there is no NP] throughout ontogeny 
 
It has been acknowledged that phonological reduction and morphosyntactic change are not useful 
diagnostics for comparing diachronic and ontogenetic change. Nonetheless, important similarities 
have been noted in terms of unidirectional patterns of semantic–pragmatic reanalysis (Diessel 2011, 
Tantucci 2018), (viz. where the form of construct remains constant) as they indeed seem to hinge on 
similar mechanisms of change (Ziegeler 1997) or similar adaptive behaviours (Givon 2009). Drawing 
on that, it has been proposed that research on intersubjectification can be informed by experimental 
findings about the ontogeny of ToM and help formulate a gradient, more elaborate redefinition of the 
intersubjective paradigm (Tantucci 2020). 
 A fundamental condition for the gradient cross-validation of intersubjectivity is polysemy 
resulting from semasiological change (i.a. Traugott & Dasher 2002). Simply put, a construct (e.g. 
[there is no NP]) needs to remain morphologically the same, yet develop multiple meanings through 
time, some of which tend to be more intersubjectified than others. The same construct can then be 
searched in a corpus of first language acquisition. Polysemies that are hypothesised to be more 
intersubjectified should then be spontaneously mastered at stages of ontogenetic development, that is 
when a ToM should be increasingly matured. In this respect, the 4th year of age is widely 
acknowledged to be as a critical stage of development towards ToM (Apperly 2010; Tantucci 2020, 
forthcoming). The aim of this approach is to provide usage-based evidence for empirically validating 
whether the meaning of a construct is more or less intersubjectified, which is a diagnostic that is 
crucially missing in current linguistic research in intersubjectivity. From this perspective, children 
are clearly not to be considered as the ‘drivers of language change’. Rather, spontaneous mastery of 
intersubjectified polysemies of the same linguistic form throughout ontogeny can help to shed light 
on different degrees of intersubjective complexity and therefore, overt linguistic mastery of ToM.        
 In this section we put this gradient approach into play and we compare the semantic and 
illocutionary change of [there is no NP] that we observed diachronically with children’s process of 
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first language acquisition of the polysemic usages of the same construction. To do so, we looked 
holistically at all the there is no/there’s no forms in all the CHILDES 3 corpora of British and 
American English respectively in the 0-3, 4-6 and 7-9 age spans. The CHILDES dataset is composed 
of different subcorpora (one for each child), covering more than 30 languages and 230 children and 
adolescents ranging from 0 to 18+ years of age. For our analysis we looked at a collection of 92 
subcorpora amounting to a total of 29,480,736 tokens, uttered by roughly by 1507 children. More 
specifically, we focused on transcriptions of children aged between 0 and 9 years, divided as follows: 
0-3, 4-6, 7-9. It is important to notice that each subcorpus contains utterances by both the child and 
other people, such as the interviewer(s) and/or carers, the child’s parents, grandparents, relatives and 
so on. Our analysis only took into account those utterances spoken by the child in contexts of 
spontaneous interaction (e.g. not being elicited for a specific task), therefore limiting the scope of the 
queries to a specific set of utterances out of the total available. This allowed us to control the settings 
of usage of the [there is no NP] forms and satisfy the independence assumption. Table 3 contains 
details for each selection, listing the total number of tokens including the non-child ones (tokens); the 
total number of tokens for only the utterances by the children (child-only tokens) and the number of 
occurrences of [there is no NP] (including the variant [there’s no NP]). 
 
selection tokens child-only tokens [there is no N] 
0-3 4,580,207 3,220,642 281 
4-6 1,874,520 905,861 196 




Total number of tokens of [there is/’s no NP] in the three subcorpora of the CHILDES 
 
We first normalised our annotated occurrences based on the larger subcorpus, (the one including data 
of the 0-3 age-span, 4,580,207 tokens, entailing a per-3.2-milion-word normalisation of the child-
only annotation strings from the two remaining subcorpora)4. We we then fitted a binomial logistic 
regression of the developmental acquisition of the chunk and its assertive vs refusal usages. While in 
section 4.5 our main effects were based on centuries, in this case we used children’s age. The choice 
                                                 
3 See https://childes.talkbank.org/ for more details. 
4 While this normalisation method generates a number predicted strings of annotation, it is yet entirely data-driven and 
preferred to classic per-million-word normalisation when mismatching datasets are associated with relatively low 
frequencies of the lexeme under enquiry (cf. Tantucci 2020).  
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of the latter as the only predictor resulted from a forward stepwise selection, followed by ANOVA 
testing for possible interactions (cf. Levshina 2015:§12).   
 
Main Effects     
 Estimate Std.Error Z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept)  -3.7075  0.506 -7.33 <0.0001*** 
Age 4-6  1.505  0.533  2.82 0.0047* 
Age 7-9  2.099  0.585  3.59 0.0003** 
 
Table 4. 
Binomial logistic regression of the illocutionary force of [there is no NP] in the CHILDES 
 
The model above is slightly different from the one in section 4.5 as it does not include the genres of 
texts as a random effect. This is due to the fact that the context in this case is quite stable, viz. based 
on spontaneous spoken interaction between the child and mother/carers, with the main effects 
satisfying the independence assumption (cf. Winter 2013). One may argue why a variable “speaker” 
was not included as a random factor in the model above. This is due to the disparity of the CHILDES 
datasets that were included in our query, some of which not comprising speakers’ identity. It is also 
important to remark that no significant interactions among other potential predictors were at play, 
which was functional to the interpretation of age as a predictor in isolation (cf. Winter 2020: §5). The 
main effects here take into account children’s ability to spontaneously produce pre-emptive refusal 
usages of the [there is no NP] construction, entailing extended intersubjectivity and generic reference 
of the locus of existence of the NP. From the table above we can see positive coefficients associated 
both with children’s capacity to utter pre-emptive refusals in the 4-6 age span (Z = 2.82, p = .0047) 
and the  7-9 age span (Z = 3.59, p = .0003) in contrast with a negative value at the intercept, 
corresponding to the 0-3 age span.  
 All in all, from our data a clear developmental trajectory emerged among formal and 
illocutionary features of [there is no NP], indicating a progressive ontogenetic ability to engage with 
pre-emptive refusal usages out of mere assertive employment of the same form. This pattern is very 
similar to the diachronic development of the same chunk towards intersubjectivity and pre-emptive 
interaction observed in section 4.5. In fact, children’s spontaneous usage of [there is no NP] is 
increasingly geared towards pre-emptive refusal strategies and intersubjectively marked interaction.  
 Examples (16-17) illustrate early usages of the chunk, which are merely aimed at assertively 
stating the (negative) existence of an entity in some location: 
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(16) CHI: daddy's gonna come in here and put out the fire. 
 INV: put out the fire?  
 CHI: put out the fire. I want ta put out the fire . 
 INV: is there a fire in the car? 
 CHI: no there’s no fire. don't have any fire. 
CHILDES Bloom70 Peter 2Y7M 
(17) INV: Could that be a swimming pool could we put that full of water?  
 CHI: look there’s no water in it . 
CHILDES Belfast Courtney 3Y4M 
 
In both (16-17) [there is no NP] merely refers to discourse-given information, without pre-emptively 
addressing how the interlocutor or a third party might react as a result of the child’s utterance. This 
can operationally be tested with the possibility of dropping the NP after there is no, and simply 
replying with a pronominal form there is none, which distinctively hinges on discourse-given 
information. This indicates that PEM is here not an overtly coded element of the usages of [there is 
no NP].  
 Quite differently, children progressively learn to use the same chunk with a pre-emptive 
refusal illocutionary force, thus overtly problematising some hypothetical state of affairs that the 
addressee or a generic third party may virtually bring to the fore.       
 
(18) CHI: I wouldn't like to go up in space because there’s no more things up, there there's  
 nothing up there.  
CHILDES Mcwhinney Mark 4Y2M 
(19) INV5: she's moving that other one up. That’s it. 
 CHI: well there’s no any room for that girl. She has to go to his mum. 
CHILDES Conti Bonnie 5Y0M 
 
Both (18-19) represent a first step towards the pre-emptive reading of [there is no NP]. In fact, the 
child is not merely interested in stating the absence of some entity in some location. Despite an 
existential meaning is still expressed propositionally, at the procedural level s/he pre-emptively 
rejects the idea of some possible project that the addressee or a generic social persona may consider 
as valid or plausible in those specific contexts. Similar to what we argued in section 4, both usages in 
                                                 
5 Interviewer. 
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(18-19) express a procedural meaning that can be referred back with the expression this cannot be 
done, which, in turn, is not felicitous in mere existential usages such as in (16-17). Similarly, they 
cannot be used pronominally in the form of there is none, as they are aimed at expressing new 
information, rather than stating the absence of some object that is already part of the ‘textual’ common 
ground among the interlocutors. This is because they are grounded in social cognition and the 
collective awareness of what a generic persona in his/her socio-cultural community of practise would 
be plausibly say under the same preparatory conditions. Usages of this kind are significantly absent 
before the 4th year of the child’s ontogenetic development, viz. when ToM abilities are shown to 
become increasingly sophisticated (cf. Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007; Kovacs et al. 
2010; Tantucci 2020). As suggested at the beginning of this section, despite evident morphosyntactic 
mismatches existing between language change and first language acquisition, however similar 
pathways of change are yet present for what concerns the semantic-pragmatic reanalysis of a 
linguistic form that remains formally the same (i.a. Ziegeler 1997; Diessel 2011; Givon 2009; 
Tantucci 2020; Tantucci & Wang 2020b). This phenomenon can be defined as onto-semasiology (cf. 
Tantucci in press) and underpins a matching trajectory in language change and child development, 
shifting from literal meanings to more idiomatic usages of the same form that are increasingly 
oriented towards intersubjectivity and collective intentionality (cf. Tomasello 2019). The implications 
of this method are the ones of exploiting phenomena of language change and intersubjectification for 
applied purposes, as increased semantic-pragmatic complexity that emerges diachronically matches  
higher complexity and (comparatively) late acquisition throughout the ontogenetic development of a 
Theory of Mind. The present study is case in point about this relationship and provides the 
methodological desiderata for addressing intersubjective complexity as an interactionally pre-
emptive mechanism emerging diachronically to shed light on ontogenetic capacities to overtly 
express a Theory of Mind throughout naturalistic interaction. 
 
6 Conclusions   
 
This paper addressed the pragmatic relationship between pre-emptive interaction and intersubjective 
awareness in language change and ontogeny. Pre-emptive interaction occurs through dialogues as a 
form of prediction-error-minimisation (PEM), viz. when an interlocutor addresses potential reactions 
that may result from his/her ongoing speech. We argue that this form of awareness is an indicator of 
intersubjectification and may constitute a trigger of constructional change. To support this claim we 
provided a corpus-based analysis of the change of the [there is no NP] construction in Early Modern 
English. The chunk shifts from a mere existential construction, characterised by an assertive 
illocutionary force, in the direction of a new pre-emptive refusal usage. This reanalysis significantly 
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correlates with a number of formal and semantic changes, such as decrease of compositionality, 
increase of procedurality and generic reference to the place or state of affairs connected with [there 
is no NP]. The semantic and pragmatic changes that we observed throughout the constructional 
change of the chunk also emerged from a large-scale analysis of the CHLDES data. This cross-
validation revealed a higher degree of complexity and extended intersubjectification of pre-emptive 
usages of [there is no NP], as children would be able to spontaneously master them at comparatively 
later stages of ontogenetic and ToM development. Our analysis indicates that it is only around the 
fourth year of age that the child starts to spontaneously master pre-emptive polysemies of [there is 
no NP], often intersecting with generic reference, presence of a complementing clause and reduced 
compositionality. 
 This novel corpus-based method is centred on the cross-validation of intersubjective 
complexity arising diachronically and the ontogenetic capacity to express a ToM as linguistically 
overt mechanism throughout spontaneous interaction. The implications of this methodology aim at a 
new applied turn of studies in language change, serving as a powerful resource for the study of 
intersubjective complexity in FLA, autistic and neuro-typical interaction. Naturalistic exchanges can 
therefore be analysed as being characterised by overt intersubjectified expressions displaying a 
gradient spectrum of complexity, ranging from literal meanings to extended intersubjectified 
polysemies. Spontaneous mastery of the latter can provide data-driven diagnostics to asses 
interlocutors’ pragmatic and semantic ability to overtly express ToM awareness and social cognition 
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